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AID, DEBT RELIEF AND NEW SOURCES
OE EINANCE EOR MEETING THE
MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS
Tony Addison, George Mavrotas and
Mark McGillivray
The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) now provide a clear set of objec-tives for mobilizing tbe international development community, notably in tbe
area of development finance. The recent Millennium Project report recommends
that bigh-income countries sbould increase official development assistance from
0.25 percent of donor GNP in 2003 to 0.44 percent in 2006 and 0.54 percent in
2015.' Tbis would amount to doubling official world aid from its current level, to
approximately $120 billion per year. The call for increased aid as well as more debt
relief and the creation of new sources of development finance has increased since tbe
UN Financing for Development Summit in Monterrey and tbe subsequent report of
ibe panel cbaired by tben President Ernesto Zedillo of Mexico on development
finance. The February 2005 meeting of G7 finance ministers pledged more aid and
more debt relief, and similar statements can be expected from world leaders in tbe
run-up to the UN Millennium summit in September 2005. If action were measured
in words rather than dollars, tben tbe problems of development finance would bave
been solved long ago.
Tbe urgency of mobilizing increased external resources eannot be overempba-
sized. The current projections for the MDGs are stark: Tbe principal MDG target—
reducing the proportion of people living in extreme poverty to balf tbe 1990 level by
2015—will not, on current trends, be acbieved in Sub-Sabaran Africa (SSA). Even
seemingly optimistic forecasts suggest the MDG income poverty target will not be
achieved in SSA until 2147—132 years late. SSA of course faces deep development
problems, but the picture is only somewhat better elsewhere; primary education
enrolment rates remain low in Soutb Asia and HIV/AIDS is rapidly spreading in tbe
Asia-Pacific region. Poor-country governments cannot mobilize enough domestic
resources to meet tbese challenges alone; generous external assistance is imperative.
Yet despite tbe evidence tbat aid broadly works, our review of trends in aid
shows that aid bas fallen for much of the recent period, with serious consequences
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for growth and poverty reduction in tbe developing world. We will highlight aid
flows to Sub-Sabaran Africa given tbe pligbt of tbat region and its importance to the
overall achievement of tbe MDGs. We will also examine recent proposals to mobi-
lize additional finance for development, focusing on those tbat bave emerged from
a recent study by UNU-WIDER for tbe UN General Assembly
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AID AND DEBT RELIEF
Aid's contributioTi to meeting the MDGs is premised on two fundamental
assumptions, namely that aid raises economic growth (tbereby reducing poverty
Traction were^measured "''''" "''" s™ '^' P™"''' '" P™-P""> '""^"'"'
J , aid relaxes the budgetary constraints impeding
in words rather than development spending (including pro-poor
dollars, the finance serviees and infrastructure).^ Tbese assump-
Drobleni would have '^""^ ^'^° underpin arguments that aid can pro-
1 1 /^ I mote human security; growth fosters peaceful
D c e n s o i v e Q l o n p a y o . ,. ,., < i • t , , ,
o o l l h d d d d l d
livelihoods and mcreased development spend-
ing may redress grievances, reducing tbe need to resort to violence as a livelibood or
to express frustration with the status quo.
However, aid's role in development is constantly questioned, no more so than in
tbe present debate on aid effectiveness, and it would be fair to say tbat criticism is
especially strong in tbe United States, wbere some bigbly influential people bave
concluded tbat aid is a complete failure in acbieving development, and indeed down-
right barmful. Typical of such a stance is a recent editorial in The Wall Street
)ournnl wbich states, "For the record, we don't put much faith in foreign aid as a
development tool. There is no evidence that the two are connected."^ By extension,
critics also dismiss debt relief as well as proposals to create new sources of develop-
ment finance.
It is certainly the ease that there are aid projects and programs that were either
ill-conceived or had unexpected and adverse development (and poverty) effects. For
example, aid for large infrastructure projects such as dams is especially controver-
sial, but tbis is also true of projects in tbe commercial world. In failing to meet tbeir
objectives, some aid projects may nevertbeless yield extremely valuable lessons, just
as some of the best commercial projects incorporate tbe lessons of previous failures
(as do some of the be.st pbilantbropic initiatives). Tbus, tbe true test of aid effec-
tiveness is not tbe existence of bad projects or programs, but whether aid does or
does not contribute to overa//economic growth and human development. This is
also the true test for other forms of external development finance such as foreign
direct investment (FDI).
However, uncovering the macroeconomic and development impact of any exter-
nal financial flow—be it aid, debt relief or FDI—is far from a straigbtforward task.
114 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
New Sourees of Finanee for Meeting the MDGs
Nevertheless, research in this area, most of which involves the econometric analysis
of panel data sets, has shown considerable progress, especially over the last decade.
This reflects advances in methodologies and greater availability of data, giving us as
much confidence in the resulting findings as in other areas of economics.
So what does the evidence show? When we review the literature we find that the
overwhelming majority of recent empirical studies conclude that aid increases eco-
nomic growth, and we cite below more than 30 studies that find that growth would
be lower in the absence of aid.'* There is also evidence that A i f | \ r n l p i n
aid increases public expenditure, including expenditures j .
that are pro-poor in orientation (such as primary education r
and basic health care). One can reasonably infer that on the C O n S t 3 . n t l y
basis of these findings, poverty would be higher in the
absence of aid. Much of the criticism of aid is not support-
ed by research, and we submit that it is research and not anecdotal evidence that
should guide aid policy. This is not to say that aid delivery cannot be improved upon
nor, as we indicated before, that there are no bad aid projects. Fundability, insuffi-
cient alignment between donor and recipient government policies, ties to the for-
profit corporate world, proliferation of donor activities within recipient countries,
and insufficient policy coherence within and among donor activities are among the
problems that need to be addressed in order to make aid work better.
After decades of little or no clarity over its effectiveness, aid now appears to
work at the macro level, and the reason for that is a matter of speculation. However,
it is widely accepted that, following the demise of the Cold War, donors are paying
more attention to developmental criteria in the design and application of aid activ-
ities.5 Another plausible reason why aid is now thought to have a positive impact is
that recent studies employ better empirical methods and have access to better data,
making it possible to observe such an impact. This of course implies that aid might
always have been effective, and that earlier studies simply lacked the tools to observe
such an impact.^
There is evidence that aid's impact on growth is contingent on the policies of
recipient countries, so that while aid works in all countries it works better in coun-
tries with better policy regimes.'' Nevertheless, there is evidence that suggests that
aid works in countries irrespective of the policy regime. Regardless of whether poli-
cy is important for aid effectiveness, it must be emphasized that both groups of stud-
ies agree that aid works, in one way or another. They agree that in the absence of aid
growth would have been lower and, to the extent that growth and poverty are posi-
tively associated, poverty would have been higher. Thus, the debate should not be
over the importance of policy per se, but should be on whether it is possible to valid-
ly observe a robust aid-policy-growth relationship from an econometric analysis of
panel data. There is some acceptance among researchers that better policies, howev-
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er defined, should in all probability result in more effective aid.^ One would also
expect that, with the exception of a few extreme cases, aid provided to countries with
bad policies (however defined) can still have positive impacts.
It is important to note that the studies referred to above used diverse samples of
countries, such as those that were structurally vulnerable, in a post-conflict scenario,
undergoing trade shocks, democratic, highly populated and so on.*^  Most impor-
. 7~. ' tantly, the samples include developing countries from
Ib hUU|cLL LU ]^] regjot^ s^  ^^d some of the studies provide resultsg p
iSCW o r that are region-specific."^ Each of these studies con-
r e t u r n s •-•^ '^ des that growth in the countries under considera-
tion would have been lower in the absence of aid. It
necessarily follows that disappointing growth records in Sub-Saharan Africa cannot
be attributed to aid ineffectiveness. In that regard, aid has not failed Sub-Saharan
Africa.
Aid can of course contribute to poverty reduction or enhance well-being in gen-
eral through channels other than growth. This is important, as growth is not the only
way to reduce poverty nor is it necessarily the most efficient way. Gomanee et al.
looked at aid and pro-poor expenditures and found that aid is associated with
increases in these expenditures and the resulting improvements in well-being."
Stephen Kosack found that, subject to the extent of democracy in recipient coun-
tries, aid is positively associated with the level of well-being among countries as
measured by the human development index.'^ Related literatures look at the impact
of aid on various categories of public expenditure and revenue.!^ Included in the
expenditure categories are those that support the provision of health and education
services important to MDC; achievement. In general, the conclusion is that aid
results in increased public expenditure, although it can also result in decreases in tax
revenue and increases in public sector debt.' *
However, it is possible to have too much of a good thing. A number of studies
sbow that aid is subject to the law of diminishing returns, i.e., aid is positively relat-
ed to growth up to a certain level (relative to recipient GDP) and negatively related
thereafter (studies find the turning point to be between 15 and 45 percent of
GDP).!'' Beyond a certain point an increase in the amount of aid may push up the
real exchange rate, thereby creating a disincentive to tbe production of tradable
goods (the so-called "Dutch Disease" effect) and constrain export-led growth.
Governments may also be limited in the amounts of aid they can use effectively'''
Donors therefore need to be conscious of absorptive capacities and to work with
recipient countries to remove bottlenecks tbat impede aid effectiveness. This is an
important matter that needs to be addressed if aid flows are increased substantially
in order to achieve the MDGs.
This is especially an issue for the group that has been labeled "fragile" or
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"stressed" by the donor community; tbe UK Department for International
Development (DFID) bas assembled a list of 46 fragile states, while the World Bank
lists approximately 30 "low-income countries under y-. . , .
stress" (LlCUS).i? Tbese are countries ibat are often ^^^^ C O U n t r i e S
marked by violent conflict (including those in "post- r e m a i n d i v i d e d
conflict" recovery) and have limited state capacities }^QW Or w h e t h e r tO
where the government's ability (or willingness) to help i
t , , , - .„ J . be more generous.
the poor has been low. Uonors will need to invest c
heavily in building up central and local state institutions in order to make aid effec-
tive in these countries.
The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative launched in 1996 (and
"enhanced" in 1999) aims to reduce debt-servicing to sustainable levels in eligible
countries. Unfortunately, rich countries remain divided over how or whether to be
more generous. The communique issued by the February 2005 meeting of G7
finance ministers is ambiguous; it promises "as much as" 100 percent debt relief for
highly indebted poor countries. However, tbe rich countries were divided as to how
this will be flnanced, if at all.
Critics of aid are also critics of debt relief, arguing that the HIPC Initiative will
do little for development. These critics ignore what the research actually shows.
Debt relief can raise growth by reducing the so-called debt-overhang effect, which Is
a disincentive to private investment, and by making available more resources for
growth-enhancing (and poverty-reducing) public investments that would otherwise
have gone into servicing debt. The negative effect of high debt on growth, in partic-
ular the destructive effect of debt overhang, is borne out by empirical research.'^ ^
This indicates that debt relief can raise growth and, by implication, reduce poverty,
with the caveat that tbe scale of poverty reduction is very much dependent on the
character of the growth process. If debt relief is not part of the total financial aid
package—for example, if donors substituted debt relief for aid—then growth is
unlikely to increase. The literature stresses the importance of the additionality of
debt relief resources.''' Debt relief must therefore go hand in hand with more aid.
DESPITE AID'S EFFECTIVENESS, AID FLOWS HAVE FALLEN
Despite research findings that aid is broadly effective, aid flows have declined
substantially from the 1990s onwards (figure 1).^" Total official development assis-
tance (ODA) peaked at $58.3 billion in 1991, dropped sharply to $43.2 billion by
1997 and partially recovered in the latter 1990s, so that total ODA by the end of
2002 was at a level that was actually lower than 11 years before. The overall trend
in total ODA was largely driven by a "pull-back" in bilateral aid. Multilateral ODA
has been more stable and has been rising modestly from I960 to 2002. Total ODA
for Sub-Saharan Africa, the region most in need of aid, fell from a peak $17.3 bil-
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Figure I: Total bilateral and multilateral official development assistance, 1960 lo 2002.
lion in 1990 to SI.6 billion bv 1999, and only reached its 1990 level again in 2002
a
(figure 2). Indeed, donors actually allocated aid away from SSA in the 1990s and the
region's share of world aid declined for much of the 1990s.
Developing countries attract, of course, development-oriented foreign financial
transfers in addition to official development assistance. From Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development {OECD) countries, they attract official
flows that do not qualify as official development assistance and private flows. The
OECD reports data on both flows, labeling the former as other official financing
(OOF) and the latter simply as private flows, which consist mainly of foreign direct
investment. A reduction in ODA might be mitigated by increases in these flows,
although there is less clarity over the impact of OOF and (to a lesser extent) private
flows on growth and poverty reduction. Such mitigation has not occurred. As figure
3 shows, OOF flows to Sub-Saharan Africa have trended downward since the late
1980s, and were negative in each of the years 1996 to 2001. OOF increased sharply
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Figure 2: Aid flows to Sub-Saharan Africa, 1960 to 2002.
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Figtire 3: Non-ODA flows to Sub-Saharan Africa, 1960 to 2002.
in 2001, but its level that year was mucb less tban that wbicb prevailed in tbe mid-
to late-1980s. Private flows have been much more volatile. They fell dramatically in
1984, recovered in 1989 and trended downward thereafter.
Wbile declines in official development assistance might be mitigated by increas-
es in other inflows, it sbould be recognized that this potential is somewhat limited
in the case of Sub-Saharan Africa. This is made clear by Table 1, whicb sbows per-
centage breakdowns of foreign inflows reported by the OECD. Official development
assistance accounted for almost 90 percent of total flows to Sub-Sabaran Africa dur-
ing 1991 to 2002, indicating tbat many of the countries in tbis region find it very
difficult to attract private capital. Not only is this share more than twice that for all
developing countries for the same period, but it is substantially higher than for the
1970s and 1980s overall. Official development assistance dependency is a reality in
Sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, even if OOF and private flows were to continue to
increase to Sub-Sabaran Africa, sucb increases would have to be dramatic and sus-
tained over many years for them to reduce tbe region's dependence on ODA.
What can we infer from trends in aid and otber foreign inflows to developing
countries in ligbt of tbe findings of the literature on the macro level impacts of offi-
cial aid? Tbere would appear to be one inescapable conclusion from tbe above data.
Civen tbat the vast majority of tbe literature finds tbat aid is effective in promoting
growth and by implication in reducing poverty, that this result holds on average for
all countries, and that reductions in aid bave not been offset by increases in other
development-oriented inflows, poverty is cleariy higher in Sub-Saharan Africa as a
result of the declines in aid to this region during the 1990s. Tbis in turn means tbat
the MDCs will be harder to achieve there tban would otherwise have been the ease.
While recent increases in aid to this region are to be weleomed, there remain many
significant challenges for governments in Sub-Saharan Africa and the international
donor communitv.
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FINDING NEW SOURCES OF DEVELOPMENT FINANCE
The "traditional" mechanisms of aid and debt relief can only take us so far, and
there has recently been nuicli discussion of "new" or "additional" sources of devel-
opment finance; in late 2004 the General Assembly discussed these at its Second
Committee (Economic & Financial) meeting, the governments of Brazil, France,
Chile and Spain organized a heads of state meeting on "Action Against Hunger and
Poverty" at the UN which focused on finance, and President Chirac of France sub-
sequently made a presentation on the theme at the 2005 Davos conference.
Potential new sources include international taxes such as the currency transactions
tax (otherwise known as the "Tobin tax") as well as taxes on environmental pollu-
tants and international travel (the French proposal to tax airline fuel), novel meas-
ures to leverage funds for aid programs from the international capital markets (the
UK International Finance Facility), and measures to stimulate additional or new pri-
vate flows, including migrant remittances and philanthropy as well as schemes such
as the global lottery and the global premium ("prize") bond. This is obviously a very
mixed bag, and the proposals involve quite different combinations of private and
public initiative. Some require major and comprehensive international agreement,
others can be put in place by individual countries or groups of countries, and still
others are purely dependent upon private action. Although some of the proposals
have been on the table for quite a long time (notably the Tobin tax), they remain
"new" in the sense that they have yet to be enacted and may offer potential for the
future either as a modest supplement to conventional aid and debt relief or as major
sources of development funding in their own right.
Debate on new sources of finance at the 2004 UN General Assembly was
focused around a new analysis by United Nations University-World Institute for
Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER) undertaken in cooperation with
United Nations-Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN-DESA) following
an earlier call for a rigorous study by the General Assembly after the 2002 UN
Financing for Development conference in Monterrey. The UNU-WIDER study was
led by Anthony Atkinson of Oxford University and we summarize the main findings
here. 21
The UNU-WIDER study first looked at global taxation, and specifically the cur-
rency transactions tax (C^TT) which would apply to transactions in the foreign-
exchange markets (spot, forward, future, swaps and other derivatives), and the study
also examined one global environmental tax (a tax on the use of hydrocarbon fuels
according to their carbon content).-- These taxes have "double dividends" in that
they meet some other goal than simply raising taxation for development purposes;
in the case of the CTT it is reducing exchange-rate volatility, while the carbon tax
will contribute to reducing global warming. However, the UNU-WIDER study con-
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Table 1: Total net disbursements of total official and private flows, by type, 1971-2001.
I971-I978 1981-1990 1991-2002
36.7
29.0
7.7
8.7
.50.7
3.9
100.0
59.5
42.0
17.5
11.2
29.3
n.a.
100.0
50.8
38,3
12.5
6.6
38.2
4.4
100.0
77.8
52.9
24.9
14.4
7.9
n.a.
100.0
43.6
30.9
12.7
4.3
47.7
4.8
100.00
88.3
54.2
34.1
0.2
1 1.5
n.a.
100.0
All Developing Countries
Official Dcvelapiiieiu Assistance (ODA)
Bilalcral
Multilateral
OlIuT Official Flows (OOF)
Private Flows
Grants from NGOs
Total
Sub-Saharan Africa
Official Development Assistance (ODA)
Bilateral
Multilateral
Other Orticia! Flows (OOF)
Private Flows
Grants from NGOs
Total
Source: OECD (2004).
centrated on the financing objective, and its main finding is that these taxes can
raise quite substantial sums at modest tax rates (below the rates proposed by those
whose main concern is with exchange-rate volatility and global warming). Thus the
CTT could generate $15 to 28 billion per year, while a carbon tax could raise $50
billion; both these taxes alone would therefore provide enough revenue to more than
double existing levels of aid (although governments would no doubt also wish to
spend some of the revenues on increasing the provision of global public goods). '^^
But although such global taxes are promising from a revenue-raising perspective (as
is the French proposal for an airline ftiel tax), they need a large amount of political
agreement internationally; the present US administration is firmly opposed, and the
French government has yet to win consensus on the issue within the European
Union.
There are alternatives to global taxation, and the United Kingdom's proposal for
the International Finance Facility (IFF) is one of these, as is the idea of creating
Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) for development purposes. The IFF's fundamental
aim is to provide predictable and stable flows within an agreed disbursement mech-
anism, thereby effectively guaranteeing funding for the poorest countries and over-
eoming the volatility in aid that bedevils current donor practices.^ "^ Long-term
pledges of a flow of annual payments to the IFF would leverage additional money
from the international capital markets through a securitization process (IFF bonds).
The IFF could achieve a flow of $50 billion during the crucial years 2010 to 2015
(i.e., tip to the target date for the MDGs), building up from 2006 and falling to zero
by 2020. A major advantage of the IFF over global taxes is that it requires a smaller
subset of countries to get the measure off the ground; indeed, the IFF does not
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require the participation of all high-income countries (it appears that Canada and
the United States are unlikely to sign tip, in part because of doubts as to whether
the IFF is consistent with their budgetary procedures). EU countries are politically
the most likely to press ahead if the United IGngdom can persuade them (France,
Germany and Italy appear to be supportive), but one as-yet-unresolved problem is
wbether the IFF is consistent with the European Union's stability and growth pact,
which aims to contain the fiscal deficits and debt levels of member states. The UK
intention is to have the IFF bonds accounted for on the books of a new IFF agency,
but if the bonds are counted as being on the balance sheet of participating govern-
ments then they will add to the problem that these countries already have in meet-
ing the so-called "Maastricht criteria." Other issues to be resolved are what happens
after 2020, and what form the new IFF organization will take.
Still, despite these difficulties, the IFF remains one of the most promising of the
new financial proposals and, in the minds of many commentators, more likely to be
realized than global taxes, which require much more international political unanim-
ity. The IFF is also much more likely to be implemented than the separate proposal
to create SDRs for development purposes, with donor countries making their SDR
allocation available to fund development.^^ The UNU-WIDER study estimates that
an SDR allocation of $25 to S30 billion could make a significant contribution to the
overall financing needs of poor countries (as well as a potentially positive impact on
the global maeroeconomy by generating economic growth in the South. Rut any
expansion in SDRs for this purpose requires the proposal to be ratified by 100 IMF
members (85 percent of the voting power of the Fund). This is much more difficult
to achieve than assembling what the UK development minister, Hilary Benn, refers
to as a "coalition of the willing" for the IFF
There is much less disagreement between governments over expanding private
flows of finance to developing countries, in part because such flows—in particular
remittances and philanthropic donations—are already sizeable and growing (a more
cynical view is that initiatives in this area do not require governments to commit
much, if any, public money). Proposals on remittances are "new" in the sense that
they aim to reduce the transfer costs involved in remitting money back to home
countries (as well as complementary measures to remove the irregular residency sta-
tus of migrants, which can make them reluctant to use lower-cost channels for remit-
ting). Given that remittances are running at $80 billion annually (mucb more than
annual aid fiows), a reduction in transfer costs could have significant benefits and
may directly contribute to meeting the MDCJs when remittances flow to poorer
households and communities. However, all of these efforts also have to be squared
with recent national legislation in the areas of money laundering and counter-ter-
rorism.^ '^
Philanthropy can raise substantial sums as well. In the United States, it accounts
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for more than 1.5 percent of incon:\e. However, much charitable giving is directed to
domestic causes, rather than to development (Germany has the largest fraction
going to overseas development).^'' Charitable donations for development by indi-
viduals and firms can certainly be increased by tax npL.^
incentives, global funds and corporate giving (including
measures that encourage payroll giving). But we must ii'tA)C)riLy Ol
also recognize that while responses such as that to the S t u d i e S
recent tsunami disaster in Asia have been outstanding, tV\qt u'\A i
and need further encouragement, charitable giving in . i
, , , c u economic erowth.
one area can expand at the expense of another. o
Moreover, as desirable as they may be, direct donations to communities and non-
governmental organizations cannot substitute for aid to fund government budgets,
particularly spending on building comprehensive, nation-wide education and health
systems (nor can charitable donations fund large-scale infrastructure projects, such
as rural electrification, that can transform livelihoods).
Finally, the UNU-WIDER study examines the proposal for a global lottery, an
idea given impetus by the Crisis Management Initiative (a Finnish NGO led by the
former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari).^^ A global lottery could be organized to
fund development, either by means of national-run versions sold parallel to existing
state and local lotteries or through a single global lottery sold worldwide through the
Internet, its revenue potential is obviously hard to estimate, but the UNU-WIDER
study comes out with a rough figure of $6 billion a year (which is feasible given that
the world market for lottery products is at least $ 120 billion per year, and gambling,
in all its forms, is a $1 trillion per year business). Although some people will buy into
a global lottery for philanthropic reasons (and this may take money away from direct
charitable donations), this may be less important to revenue generation than its abil-
ity to compete with other lottery and gambling products. No doubt some people will
question the ethics of financing development in this way, but it must be said that
lotteries are now a very common means for national and regional governments to
fund themselves across the world—and the MDGs are a cause that is at least as wor-
thy as many existing uses of lottery revenues. An alternative proposal in the UNU-
WIDER study is to create a global premium bond for development modeled on the
very successful UK premium bond (which provides funding for the British govern-
ment); bonds are entered into a monthly prize draw, and the prizes provide an
income stream (which depends on the bondholder's luck) with no loss of the initial
investment (in contrast to the purchase of an unlucky lottery ticket). This may be
more ethically acceptable than a lottery product. Governments may oppose both
ideas if either threatens their own funding (lotteries and casinos have grown increas-
ingly important to the finances of l(K'al governments in both Australia and the
United States, for example), and commercial gambling operators often have power-
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ful political friends. However, not all governments have to sign up to put these prod-
ucts into the marketplace, and since their purchase is voluntary they do not face the
political difficulties inherent in increasing aid from general tax revenues or from
introducing new global taxes.
In summary, a range of possibilities now exist that can provide more develop-
ment finance (and we have only discussed a subset in this paper). A key point is that
these opportunities should not crowd out existing official flows but must supplement
them. For example, in pressing the case for global taxes governments should not
allow these to substitute for increasing their bilateral and multilateral aid flows. As
with debt relief, additionality is crucial.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper has examined the macroeconomic impact of official aid, paying spe-
cial attention to its contributions to growth and poverty reduction. It showed that
the empirical literature, published over the last seven or eight years, concludes over-
whelmingly that growth in developing countries would have been lower in the
absence of official aid. As such, it is reasonable to conclude by extension that pover-
ty would have heen higher in the absence of these flows. The paper then highlight-
ed a substantial downturn in world aid flows in the 1990s. It also highlighted down-
turns in aid to Sub-Saharan Africa, where the MDGs will be hardest to achieve, and
in non-aid, development-oriented flows. Given that the vast majority of the litera-
ture finds that aid is effective in promoting growth, and by implication in reducing
poverty, that this result holds on average for all countries, and that reductions in aid
have not been offset by increases in other development-oriented inflows, the paper
argued that poverty is clearly higher in Sub-Saharan Africa as a result of the declines
in aid to these regions during the 1990s. This in turn means that the MDGs will be
harder to achieve in this region than would otherwise have been the case. While
recent increases in aid to this region are to be welcomed, there remain many signif-
icant challenges for governments in Sub-Saharan Africa and the international donor
community.
The obvious challenge is to sustain recent increases in official aid to Sub-
Saharan Africa. Another appropriate response is to look to other innovative sources
of external finance to assist in the achievement of the MDGs. A number of possible
sources have been recently proposed. These include the Tobin Tax, the International
Finance Facility, a global lottery, a global premium bond, development-focused spe-
cial drawing rights and global environment taxes.^ "^  These sources should be seen as
an augmentation of official aid, building on the positive impact of these flows while
at the same time increasing the poverty-reducing impact of this category of inflow.
Ultimately, it is a case of not throwing the baby out with the bathwater. ^
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